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CAN THE COURTS COPE WITH THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT?
by Victor Rabinowitz*
On January 19, 1977, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1
(FSIA) became effective, to the accompaniment of loud huzzas from
the State Department, the Justice Department and the international
law establishment, which had been promoting the bill with energy
for about six years.2 The problems to which the Act addressed itself
were, among others:
(1) What procedure shall be followed in determining when a
foreign sovereign will be granted immunity from suit?3
* Member of Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman,
New York City. B.A. 1931, J.D. 1934, University of Michigan.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2-4), (1391 (f), 1441 (d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
2. See, e.g., s. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976) 1herein-
after cited as SENATE REPORTI ; OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320-28
(1976). An impressive list of lawyers, representing an important segment of
American banking and industrial interests, supported the bill. See, e.g., /urisdic-
tion of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmenlal Relations of
the House Comm. on the ludiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-97 (1976) (state-
ments of international law practitioners) Ihereinaftei cited as House Hearings
19761.
3. The FSIA also addresses two closely related procedural problems:(1) how does a claimant against a foreign sovereign get jurisdiction over his
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(2) What are the substantive rules to be applied in determin-
ing whether immunity will be granted to a sovereign defendant?
This article will examine the question of under what circum-
stances and by what procedure sovereign immunity should be
granted.
The doctrine that a sovereign cannot be sued without its con-
sent has been engraved deeply in our law and in the law of most
other nations, and was well recognized by the 18th and 19th century
international law authorities.4  The prohibitions against suing a
claimed debtor; and (2) how is a judgment against a sovereign to be enforced.
Prior to the passage of the Act, the normal method of securing jurisdiction over
a sovereign was by the attachment of its property, thus giving quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. It was through such an attachment that most of the pre-1979
sovereign immunity cases arose and it was generally agreed that the procedure
was undesirable in many respects. As has been pointed out, pre-judgment
attachments are a harsh remedy. They are often granted on ex parte applic-
ations and frequently have the effect of tying up property for months or even
years while the merits of a case were litigated. The Supreme Court has, in a
series of decisions, suggested that many of the state statutes permitting pre-
judgment attachments were unconstitutional. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
The statute solves this problem in what appears to be a satisfactory
method by providing for long-arm jurisdiction through service of process upon
the Foreign Office of the defendant either directly or through diplomatic
channels.
Regarding the enforcement of a judgment against a sovereign, prior to the
enactment of the FSIA there were no comprehensive provisions in U.S. law
relating to this problem. jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant could
be obtained only be seizing and attaching the sovereign's property, and judg-
ments against sovereign defendants could not be enforced because they enjoyed
absolute immunity from execution. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
The question of recovering on the money judgment secured against a foreign
sovereign was addressed by the Act. The rule had long been that while juris-
diction over a foreign sovereign could be obtained by securing quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, the judgment could not be satisfied by attaching the property of
a sovereign even in a case in which sovereign immunity from suit had not been
recognized. See Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. (1930); New York & Cuba v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). It is too early to make even a tentative judgment as to how
this provision will be applied by the courts.
4. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his con-
sent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he repre-
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sovereign have been applicable whether the claimant was a citizen or
an alien of the defendant state, i.e., a citizen of the United States
could no more sue his own sovereign without its permission than he
could a foreign sovereign. 5  The general rule was promulgated b
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,
and was accepted without much question for over a century.
However, the nature of international trade had so changed
after the second decade of the 20th century that the rules promul-
gated by Chief Justice Marshall and his successors required re-
examination. After World War 'I, many nations owned or chartered
vessels for the purpose of carrying on conventional commercial
activity. When ordinary contract or tort claims were asserted against
a sovereign, the courts had difficulty in dealing with them, resulting
in a series of inconsistent and indecisive rulings, and leaving the law
in some disarray. 7
sents, prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the
courts of another sovereignty. . . . Hence, a citizen of the nation
wronged by the conduct of another nation, must seek redress
through his own government.
United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875). In the early 19th century,
generally speaking, the property of a sovereign stayed at home except when at
war. The waging of war was universally understood to be an essential part of a
sovereign's function. No one challenged the doctrine that causes of action
arising from such activity were immune from suit; it would be absurd for a
farmer at Waterloo to bring an action in tort because the British Army had killed
his cow.
5. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it con-
sents to be sued . . .and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define
that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The consent of the United States to be sued cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed. United States v. King, 395 U.S.
1, 4 (1969). See also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976); Fitzgerald
v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Per-
mission to sue the sovereign has been granted by statute in some cases, but not
without limitation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) (limitations on tort
liability of the United States).
6. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
7. Compare The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921) (suggestion of immunity
must be certified by Dep't of State and shall not be granted if asserted directly
in court by foreign government) with Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S.
562 (1926) (assertion made directly in court by foreign government is sufficient
for court to grant immunity, if such assertion can be substantiated). See also
Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68 (1938) (foreign government may apply to either the Dep't of State or the
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By the end of World War II, virtually every statewas engaged in
activities that were commercial in nature. When creditors of those
states sought to apply commercial law to disputes arising from such
activities, the sovereigns sought to rely on the historical rules of
sovereign immunity. It was argued by creditors that if, for example,
a sovereign purchased wheat, it should not be able to avoid the obli-
gation to pay for it by a plea of sovereign immunity. 8 It was urged
strenuously that the doctrine of absolute immunity, which appeared
to be a consequence of the Schooner Exchange decision, be changed
to a policy of "restrictive immunity," applicable only when the
transaction involved was a government function.
In 1952 Jack Tate, Acting Legal Advisor for the State Depart-
ment, issued a statement setting forth Department policy.9  The
"Tate Letter" announced that henceforth the State Department
would not issue suggestions of immunity in cases in which the right
asserted arise out of commercial transactions (ure gestiones) and
would utilize its power to grant suggestions of immunity only in
litigation in which governmental rather than commercial interests
were involved (lure imperil).
Prior to the passage of the FSIA, when an action was started
against a sovereign, the defendant either applied to the State Depart-
ment for a suggestion of immunity, or pleaded, as a defense to the
action, that it was immune from suit.1 0 In the former (and more
common) situation, the State Department, using its own standards,
would either file with the court a suggestion of immunity, or refuse
to file a suggestion. Where the Department determined that the de-
fendant was immune from suit, the court was bound by that deter-
mination.1 1  This was based on the assumption that if the State
court; the court is bound to accept finding of immunity by Dep't of State but
not bound to grant immunity asserted directly by foreign government).
8. See, e.g., Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), discussed in note 12
infra.
9. 26 DEP'T STAYE BULL. 984 (1952).
10. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945); Ex
Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
11. In Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588, the Court stated:
That principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction,
by the seizure and detention of the property of a freindly sovereign,
as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting
foreign relations ...the judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly
foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and may so
affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to
19801
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Department thought litigation might interfere with relations between
the United States and a foreign sovereign, the courts should not
interfere. The Tate Letter did not purport to direct the courts in
their own consideration of pleas of immunity, but when the State
Department refused to grant a suggestion of immunity, the courts
usually concurred. When no application was made to the State
Department, the courts decided the question on their own, having
assumed that if the State Department had not spoken on the subject,
the courts were free to apply their own standards, which were
usually those of the Tate Letter. 12
To assist in determining when sovereign immunity should be
granted, the State Department set up an informal hearing procedure
through which litigants could argue the issue before the Legal Ad-
visor. The State Department hearing procedure determined first,
whether the defendant was in fact the sovereign, and, second, assum-
ing an affirmative answer, whether immunity ought to be granted.
The State Department determinations were not reviewable. The
FSIA changed this procedure by transfering the determination of
whether a litigation involved a commercial transaction to the judicial
branch.
The State Department evidently felt that the procedure it had
been following to determine whether sovereign immunity ought to
be granted was a great burden. It had to process suggestions of im-
munity filed by defendant sovereigns, and to hold hearings on such
suggestions. 13  It claimed that this function Interfered with the
proper management of United States foreign policy because foreign
sovereigns felt, incorrectly, that they could put pressure on the State
accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is
immune.
12. The leading case on the subject is Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934
(1965). The court, in the absence of an immunity suggestion from the Depart-
ment of State, adopted restrictive guidelines, limiting immunity to internal
administrative acts, legislative acts, acts concerning the drmed forces, diplomatic
activities, and public loans. Id. at 360. Since the charter party in Victory Trans-
port involved a shipment of wheat and was found by the court to have all the
earmarks of a typical commercial transaction, it did not fit any of the immunity
categories, and immunity was therefore denied.
13. In the 12 years between 1960 and 1973 there were a total of 48
cases on which the Department of State reached final decision. Immunity was
suggested in 23 cases. During that period there were an average of six cases
pending at any one time. See Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H. R.
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Department for a grant of immunity, whereas the same pressure
could not be applied to a court. The FSIA, by transferring to the
courts the responsibility of deciding pleas of sovereign immunity,
shifted that burden to the Judicial Branch, but may have done so in
violation of the principles of United States v. Curtis-Wright Export
Corp. 14 as applied specifically to sovereign immunity cases.
15
The issue of the judiciary's exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign had been discussed in the act of state cases where it
was pointed out that a court might challenge the dignity of a foreign
sovereign, with potential embarrassment to the Executive Branch
and, more importantly, that the Executive Branch had expertise in
the conduct of foreign affairs which the courts lacked. 16 Harlan's
3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1973) Ihereinafter cited
as House Hearings 19731.
14. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In his opinion Mr. Justice Sutherland con-
cluded that, because of the delicate nature of foreign affairs, the executive
branch (i.e., the President) should be accorded a degree of discretion and free-
dom from restriction which would not be permissible with respect to domestic
affairs alone:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation . .. [the President has]
very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... in the field of inter-
national relations-.a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the ap-
plicable provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 319-320.
15. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex Parte
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
16. The difference between the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity should be kept in mind. Sovereign immunity relates only to
whether a domestic court will accept jurisdiction of a case against a foreign
sovereign, thus possibly incurring its ill will. A grant or denial of immunity im-
plies no finding on the merits-a grant of immunity forecloses judicial decision
on the merits, while denial merely allows the suit to proceed on the merits. The
act of state doctrine, on the other hand, necessarily reaches the merits. Absent
the doctrine, courts would be required to pass judgment on the legality velnon
of the acts of a foreign sovereign. At this level the potential for "embarrass-
ment" becomes critical.
Many commentators, led by Mr. Justice White in his opinion in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696-706 (1976),
and the Solicitor General in his brief amicus curiae, at 13-15, Alfred Dunhill v.
Cuba, supra, have confused the two doctrines, a confusion which no doubt stems
19801
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Opinion in Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino 17 Brennan's dissent in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional18 and Marshall's dissent in
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba 1 9 point out the danger of compelling
courts to decide issues that are beyond their capacity to decide. Not
only would the executive arm of the government be embarrassed if
the courts were required to decide sensitive issues in the field of
foreign relations, but, more importantly, at least to the Supreme
Court, the judiciary would "become embroiled in the politics of
international relations to the damage not only of the courts and the
Executive but of the rule of law."20
from the fact that both these commentators disapprove of both doctrines and
seek to restrict the operation of both. The difference between the doctrines has
been articulated by the Supreme Court in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773-4 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); 789 n.
13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state have, however, at
least one thing in common-both raise the question of whether our courts will be
called upon to exercise functions which are basically political in nature.
17. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
18. 406 U.S. 759, 776 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20.. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional, 406 U.S. at 778 (Brennan,
j., dissenting). See also comments of former Attorney General Katzenbach on
the famous Rose Mary decision, Anglo Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate, 119531 1
W.L.R. 246 (Sup. Ct. Aden). The case involved the litigation of title to oil ex-
traced from wells belonging to a British-owned company that were nationalized
by Iran. The Rose Mary, carrying oil from those wells, was attached by the com-
pany while in the Port of Aden. The defendant charterers of the vessel claimed
that the Iranian nationalization law had divested the company of its title to the
oil. The court disagreed, holding that title to the oil remained in the company
because the Iranian nationalization decree was invalid because it expropriated
property without compensation. Commenting on the decision, Mr. Katzenbach
stated:
Objectivity of judgment and judicial independence are vital domestic
principles that have a more limited scope in the jungle of interna-
tional affairs: the seizure and sale of Iranian oil by Mossadegh's gov-
ernment is distinguishable from Roe's conversion of Doe's cow ...
The English government had unequivocally expressed and widely cir-
culated its views-what the court Iin AdenI called its 'public policy'
-with regard to the 'illegality' of the Iranian nationalization decree;
as an incident of diplomatic pressure, it was clearly desirable from
the government's point of view to limit the salability of Iranian oil
in the world market. That the English court could have responsibly
ignored this Idiplomatic I policy is inconceivable.
Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse." Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in
Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1155 (1956).
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Of the three interests involved, the interest of the creditor in en-
forcing a claim, the interest of the State Department in avoiding the
necessity of making decisions, and the interest of the court in main-
taining its independence from the Executive, it is the latter consid-
eration that has priority, and the Act has violated that principle.
It is submitted that the Congressional action was wrong in
principle. Had the Act been in effect for the last ten years, serious
problems would have arisen which might have been most "embar-
rassing" to United States foreign policy. Even now, important litiga-
tion in our courts raises the question whether the courts' jurisdiction
over delicate political disputes is desirable. Several cases in the past
two decades will serve to illustrate:
(1) Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 21  On July 24, 1961, an
Eastern Airlines plane was hijacked over Florida and forced to fly to
Havana. It was one of a series of hijackings of commercial planes of
the United States to Cuba, and public interest in the incident was
very high, especially in view of the bad relations then existing
between the United States and Cuba. Cuba, on its part, asserted that
for a period of about two years, Cubans had been hijacking airplanes
from Cuba and running them to Florida. The matter was raised in
the Security Council of the United Nations, and, on August 2, 1961,
the Government of the United States made a formal declaration that
it would return all hijacked property belonging to Cuba if prompt
application were made to the State Department. 22 On August 16th
Cuba released the Eastern Airlines plane. 23 On the very next day, the
Bahia De Nipe, a Cuban-owned freighter, was diverted by its captain
into United States territorial waters at Hampton Roads, Virginia. In
the next five days, five separate writs of attachment were sued out
against the ship and cargo.'4
21. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
22. 1 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAt. LEGAL
PROCESS, 88, 93, 95 (1968) Ihereinafter cited as CHAYESi.
23. Id. at 103.
24. The claims were, inter alia, for wages by the defecting crew mem-
bers, by a judgment creditor of Cuba attempting to collect ona judgment ob-
tained in Louisiana and by United Fruit Sugar Co. which claimed to own the
cargo on board the vessel because it had been seized by the Government of Cuba
as part of its nationalization program. 197 F. Supp. at 712. The incident
occurred shortly after the decision of the District Court in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), which was decided on
March 31. Under that decision, on the merits, United Fruit was entitled to the
cargo.
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On August 19th the Cuban Government advised the State
Department that the ship belonged to it and later asserted that it
was entitled to immunity as the property of a sovereign. On the
same day the State Department issued its suggestion of immunity,
stating that "the release of this vessel would avoid further disturb-
ances to our international relations in the premises." 25 The United
States Attorney appeared in the case as attorney for the Coast Guard
and the United States. The lawyers for the Cuban Government were
asked not to appear in the litigation because such appearance might
result in an adverse reaction from the court in view of the very bad
relations between Cuba and the United States.
In the course of argument, government counsel stated that even
the short delay of two weeks which had been caused by the litigation
was proving a matter of serious embarrassment to the United States.
The court held that the ship was immune from seizure pursuant to
the decision in Ex Porte Peru. 26
There can be no doubt that the State Department, in declaring
that the Bahia De Nipe was protected by sovereign immunity, was
violating the policy set forth in the Tate letter, since the Cuban vessel
was clearly engaged in a commercial enterprise. In view of the
dramatic background of the case, little of which appears in the court
opinions, to have denied the claim of sovereign immunity, or even to
have litigated it at length, would have resulted in a serious set-back
to United States foreign policy.
(2) Spacil v. Crowe. 27 On October 2, 1973, a Chilean plaintiff
attached a Cuban vessel while the latter was transiting the Panama
Canal, claiming breach of contract by the Cuban Government in con-
nection with a prior sale of sugar to Chile. The ship was carrying
commercial cargo, and the cause of action asserted by plaintiff also
arose out of a commercial transaction. Cuba requested the State
Department to file a suggestion of immunity which, after a hearing,
was issued by the State Department and recognized by the court pur-
suant to Ex Porte Peru. The State Department has commented that
it
does not regard this case as a departure from the restrictive
theory of immunity as set forth in the 'Tate letter'. ...
It involved a combination of unusual circumstances that
make the case sui generis. Although the underlying trans-
25. CHAYES, supro note 22, at 109.
26. 197 F. Supp. at 725. See note 11 supra.
27. 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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actions were commercial in character, the case as it devel-
oped centered upon issues between two foreign sovereigns
of peculiar political sensitivity and not suitable for litiga-
tion in United States courts.28
The court likewise noted that "the degree to which granting or deny-
ing a claim of immunity may be important to foreign policy is a
question on which the judiciary is particularly ill-equipped to second
guess the executive." 29
Had the FSIA been in effect either in 1961 or in 1973,
sovereign immunity should have been denied in both the Rich and
Spacil cases, because both transactions were clearly commercial
within the Act. As the State Department asserted in both cases, such
a result would have been contrary to the best interests of the United
States. 30
(3) The Iranian litigation. Even more serious is the situation
which arose in 1979 resulting from the revolution in Iran and the
seizure of approximately 50 hostages at the United States Embassy
in Teheran. In response to these incidents, the United States, acting
pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Trading With The
Enemy Act, 31 issued an order blocking the transfer of Iranian funds
on deposit in the United States or elsewhere subject to the control
of nationals in the United States.32
This action has resulted in a flood of litigation in the United
States District Courts. In the Southern District of New York alone,
there are almost 90 pending cases. The list of defendants includes
the Republic of Iran, Bank Markazi Iran (the central bank of Iran),
and other Iranian governmental agencies. Although it is too early to
attempt any analysis of the incipient litigation, it is clear that it re-
lates to what may be the most delicate foreign relations dispute the
United States has been involved with since the Cuban missle crisis of
1962. Virtually all of these actions raise questions of sovereign im-
munity, but they are pending before many different district court
judges, some of whom have already indicated differences of
opinion. 33 In each of these cases the defendants probably have, or
28. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 1973 DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (1974).
29. 489 F.2d at 619.
30. See notes 25 and 28 and accompanying text supra.
31. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 (1917), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1977,
Pub. L. 95-223, Title I, §§ 101 (a), 102, 103(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1626.
32. 31 C.F.R. § 535.101 (1979).
33. Compare Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,
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are likely to enter pleas of sovereign immunity, and were this within
the jurisdiction of the State Department, they could be considered in
the context of relations between the United States and Iran. Such a
luxury, however, is not permitted to the State Department under the
Act, and instead it finds itself in the position of having to act
through the courts.
Indeed, the State Department has filed a "suggestion of in-
terest". in many of the cases. 34 This suggestion notes that the United
States is in the midst of an unprecedented international crisis:
The efforts to secure the release of the hostages in Tehran
are at a very delicate stage. Under the circumstances, the
Department of State has reason to believe that the content
of the briefs to be filed in this action raise the possibility
that their filing will prejudice the efforts being made with
respect to the hostage crisis.
35
Accordingly, it was suggested that "in light of the rapidly developing
events in Iran" the court stay all proceedings for a total period of 90
days pending diplomatic efforts to solve the problem.
36
That complex questions will have to be decided in the Iranian
litigation is unavoidable, but what should be avoidable is the effort
to submit the sovereign immunity questions and their political
consequences to the decisions of a variety of district courts.
475 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979) with Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian
Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Both cases involve the interpreta-
tion of the 1957 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran, in the
light of the FSIA. As a matter of fact, neither court seems to have plumbed the
depths of the complexities caused by the Act in relation to this and about 20
similar treaties of amity to which the United States is a party. For example, the
Iranian Treaty provides that disputes between the parties arising under the
Treaty are to be submitted to the Permanent Court of International justice, not
to a United States district court. This would seem to presuppose a decision by
the State Department in the first instance; otherwise the PCIJ would have no
iurisdiction. But there is room for such a decision under the FSI A. We will not
venture a prediction as to how this and a series of related problems will be re-
solved, but it seems difficult to see how they can be resolved without considera-
tion of many political questions.
34. Chas. T. Main Int. v. Iran, No. 79-6276 (S.D.N.Y., February 14,
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(4) International Association of Machinists v. OPEC. 37 Here
the plaintiff sued OPEC 3 8 and its thirteen oil-producing member
nations, contending that the defendants' price-fixing policies violated
the anti-trust laws of the United States. The court upheld a plea of
sovereign immunity against the argument that the subject matter of
the suit was a commercial transaction. We will discuss this case
further but pause now only to note that incalculable and unpredict-
able political consequences might have resulted, had a district court
held that OPEC and its constituent members could be tried in a
United States court for violating the United States anti-trust laws.
No less unfortunate is the statute's attempt to define a com-
mercial transaction. If the application of a restrictive policy of
sovereign immunity were entrusted to the State Department, the
doctrine could be conformed reasonably to what is required by the
diplomatic interests of the nation. When rigidly defined by the legis-
lature, however, the result could be quite different. The legislative
enactment of the restrictive doctrine ignores the important consid-
eration articulated by the District Court in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba:
"No policy with respect to international relations is so fixed that it
cannot be varied in the wisdom of the Executive. Flexibility, not
uniformity, must be the controlling factor in times of strained inter-
national relations."
3 9
We doubt seriously whether the distinction between jure imperii
and jure gestionis is workable when set forth in legislative terms
which a court, is, in theory, obligated to follow. 4 0 Many commen-
37. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
38. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Algeria, Ecuador,
Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
39. 197 F. Supp. 710, 724 (E.D.Va. 1961).
40. For example, in discussing the "Tate Letter" the court in Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964) stated
that some courts "have looked to the nature of the transaction, categorizing as
sovereign acts only activity which could not be performed by individuals. While
this criterion is relatively easy to apply it ofttimes produces rather astonishing
results...." Nonetheless, this approach was advocated in the government's
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976), where the Solicitor General considered that a contract by a
sovereign to purchase clothing for its army was a commercial act. Govt. Br., p.
30, fn. 13. However, on the other hand, in Aero Trade, Inc. v. Republic of
1980]
N.Y.J. INT'L & ComIP. L.
tators are of the opinion that the distinction between governmental
and commercial acts is impossible to apply and, as we have seen, the
Tate letter distinction has been followed or ignored by the State
Department as called for by the foreign policy requirements of the
United States.
4 1
There is, however, another and much more serious problem-a
problem which is not met either by the Tate Letter, the judicial
definition in Victory Transport,4 2 or the legislative definition in the
FSIA. That problem by its nature cannot be solved by the adoption
of any formula, but must be handled on a case-by-case basis because
it is, by its nature, a world-wide political problem which is much
more important than the domestic political problem giving rise to
the Curtis Wright rule. 43
The world has changed much since the days of Schooner
Exchange. One of the most fundamental changes has been the emer-
gence of the so-called developing nations as independent states whose
existence depends on the export of raw materials to the industrial-
ized northern hemisphere. The United Nations has on many occa-
sions pointed out that every nation has, in a fundamental sense,
sovereignty over its natural resources and may determine the terms
upon which those resources are exploited. 4 4 To a purchaser in the
Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), Judge Weinfeld held that the purchase
of goods for the use of the armed forces was entitled to a grant of immunity.
.41. In England, the British courts abandoned the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity in The Philippine Admiral 119761 1 LLoYD's L. REP. 234;
119771 A.C. 373; Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria
11977] 1 LLOYD's L. REP. 581; 119771 1 Q.B. 529. The English Law on the
subject was considered at some length in the I Congresso, 119801 1 LLOYD'S L.
REP. 23. Evidently, the English courts are having as much difficulty in defining
commercial transactions as our courts, particularly in those areas in which there
are political issues of significance to the parties in the litigation and to the gov-
ernment of the court in which the proceedings are pending.
Also see, in addition to the Rich and Spacil cases, Isbrandtsen Tankers,
Inc., v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971).
42. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); see note 12 supra.
43. See note 14 supra.
44. Resolution 1803, G.A. Res. 1803, § I(1), 17 U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm.
327, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/5 R 850 (1962); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, G.A. Res. 3281, Ch. II, Art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX)
(1974); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order in 1974, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), § 4(e), U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess.,
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United States, the sale of oil by Kuwait may be a simple com-
mercial action to which sovereign immunity could not be applied.
To the OPEC nations and much of the rest of the world, however,
this may not be true since the sale of oil and other natural resources
involves sovereign acts governed in every respect by local law, with-
out which the people of undeveloped nations must be condemned to
an existence of perpetual deprivation and poverty.
This problem was addressed by the court in International
Association of Machinists v. OPEC. 45 In upholding the plea of
sovereign immunity, the court found the statutory standards defining
a commercial transaction to be "somewhat nebulous . . . in the con-
text of a particular factual situation." 46  The District Court sug-
gested that ".in determining whether to define a particular act nar-
rowly or broadly, the court should be guided by the legislative in-
tent of the FSIA, to keep our courts away from those areas that
touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign countries." 47
Nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicates any such
legislative intent-indeed, as has already been noted, the legislative
intent of the FSIA was quite the contrary. 4 8 The District Court
"solved' the problem by holding that "commercial activity" should
be defined narrowly. The court proceeded to examine, not the stan-
dards enacted by the legislature but rather "the standards recog-
nized under international law."49 The court quoted as authority
Resolution 1803 of the 17th Session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations (1962)50 as well as a series of similar resolutions
running up to 1966. The court stated: "The defendants' control
over their oil resources is an especially sovereign function because
oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-producing resource, is
crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples." '5 1 The court noted
a similar historical development in the United States.5 2 We think
Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559; Resolution 3171, G.A.
GAOR 30 (Vol. 1) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
45. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
46. Id. at 567.
47. Id.
48. Section 1602 of the FSIA declares as a purp
"c Ilaims of foreign states to immunity should hencefc
courts of the United States and of the States .... 28 U.
49. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
50. Resolution 1803, supra note 44.
51. 477 F. Supp. at 568.
52. Id. The court cited the Connally Hot Oil Act,
Res. 3171, 28 U.N.
ose of the Act that
)rth be decided by
S.C. § 1602 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 715, et
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that the result reached by the court was correct and that its argu-
ment was eminently reasonable and quite in line with the political
requirements of the situation. To say, however, that the decision
was required by or even consistent with the FSIA is, we think,
unjustified. The court paid its proper respects to the Act but paid
little attention to its terms.
Neither the enactment of the FSIA nor its recent application
in the courts has resolved the inherent problems raised by pleas
of sovereign immunity. The solutions adopted by Congress are
unworkable and may even be unconstitutional. The State and
Justice Department officials and many of the other witnesses
testifying for the bill misled the legislature into the adoption of a law
which is, at best, inconvenient and, at worst, disastrous.
The State Department has been confronted with the same
dilemmas that plagued it prior to the enactment of the FSIA. Be-
cause of the pcitical problems implicit in sovereign immunity
cases, the State Department's involvement has not been diminished;
on numerous occasions, foreign policy considerations have forced
it to intervene in a pending case.
The State Department has the flexibility to base its decisions
upon political reality and foreign policy interests. The courts,
of necessity, must make their decisions on the basis of abstract and
inconclusive guidelines provided by the Act. Judicial determina-
tions of sovereign immunity without reference to the broader po-
litical context can seriously impede the development and imple-
mentation of a coherent and consistent American foreign policy.
The responses of the courts have been telling of the obstructive
nature of the Act in the delicate area of foreign affairs and point
to the conclusion that the issue of sovereign immunity is better
left outside the courts.
seq. (1976), enacted by Congress to enforce state statutes imposing restrictions
requiring proration and limiting the quantities of oil that could be taken from
the wells.
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